Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner Crystallex\u27s Attempts to Recover on Its ICSID Award by Wesson, Sam
Loyola of Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Review 
Volume 42 Number 1 Article 4 
Winter 2-28-2019 
Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner Crystallex's Attempts to 
Recover on Its ICSID Award 
Sam Wesson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr 
 Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Business Administration, 
Management, and Operations Commons, Civil Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Common Law 
Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, 
Diplomatic History Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Economic Policy Commons, 
Environmental Law Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Geological 
Engineering Commons, Government Contracts Commons, Growth and Development Commons, 
International Business Commons, International Economics Commons, International Law Commons, 
International Relations Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Land Use 
Law Commons, Latin American History Commons, Latin American Studies Commons, Latina/o Studies 
Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legal Commons, Legal Remedies 
Commons, Mining Engineering Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law 
Commons, Other Business Commons, Other Legal Studies Commons, Political History Commons, 
Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sam Wesson, Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner Crystallex's Attempts to Recover on Its ICSID Award, 42 
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 147 (2019). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol42/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola 
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount 
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 
Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner Crystallex's Attempts to Recover on Its ICSID 
Award 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate 2019 at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A. in History 2015, U.C. Santa Cruz. This paper 
is a student note written primarily in 2017-18. I would like to thank Professor Hiro Aragaki and James 
Trotter for their time and advice. Thank you also to the members of ILR. I have enjoyed working with you 
all over the past two years. 
This article is available in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review: 
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol42/iss1/4 
WESSON (FINAL_FOR_JCI) 10/28/2019 2:15 PM 
 
147 
 
Venezuela Undermines Gold Miner 
Crystallex’s Attempts to Recover on Its 
ICSID Award 
SAM WESSON* 
 
 
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article follows an investment dispute that arose after the 
Venezuelan government refused to grant a Canadian mining company an 
environmental permit. Its refusal effectively denied the company its 
rights to mine Las Cristinas, one of the largest proven gold deposits in the 
world.1 The denial came after Crystallex International Corporation 
(“Crystallex”) had spent over 500,000,000 United States Dollars 
(“USD”) getting Las Cristinas to the “shovel-ready stage.”2 In response 
to Venezuela’s expropriation of the mine, an International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunal awarded 
Crystallex 1,200,000,000 USD in compensation in 2016 (the “Award”).3 
In November 2017, Crystallex set aside that compensatory award, 
enforceable now, for a settlement in installments from a country facing 
 
        *    J.D. Candidate 2019 at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A. in History 2015, U.C. Santa 
Cruz. This paper is a student note written primarily in 2017-18. I would like to thank Professor 
Hiro Aragaki and James Trotter for their time and advice. Thank you also to the members of ILR. 
I have enjoyed working with you all over the past two years.  
 1. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, 
Award, ¶ 7 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award.]. See Corporate Profile, 
CRYSTALLEX, http://www.crystallex.com/Company/CorporateProfile/default.html (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2018). 
 2. Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 195. 
 3. Id. ¶ 961. 
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insolvency, and then Venezuela reneged on the settlement.4 This article 
will explore why the parties likely made these moves. The short answer: 
Venezuela in its current political, economic, and legal position is largely 
incompatible with the ICSID system, meaning that for Crystallex and for 
Venezuela’s other claimant creditors, the only thing that is certain about 
collecting on an ICSID award is that they must pay their legal fees. 
Crystallex is a mining company based out of Toronto, Canada.5 The 
company was traded publicly on the OTCB Marketplace until 2011.6 Its 
founders formed the company to develop and operate gold mines in South 
America.7 The expropriated Las Cristinas site served as Crystallex’s 
biggest investment and potential reward.8 In 2011, when the Venezuelan 
government under Hugo Chávez nationalized the gold industry and took 
back Las Cristinas, it put Crystallex into bankruptcy.9 Crystallex 
responded by initiating arbitration against Venezuela at ICSID.10 Upon 
securing its Award in 2016, the company secured litigation financing 
from a hedge fund to gain the funds necessary to collect on that Award in 
the United States.11 
Crystallex now has registered its Award in the United States.12 
However, it has not yet succeeded in executing on Venezuelan assets as 
of March 2019.13 Back in November of 2017, Venezuela and Crystallex 
reached a settlement agreement for payment of an undisclosed sum in 
exchange for Crystallex dropping its execution efforts.14 Yet, as of July 
 
 4. See Shayna Posses, Venezuela, Crystallex Deal Ok’d In $1.2B Mine Row, LAW 360 (Nov. 
27, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/988254/venezuela-crystallex-deal-ok-d-in-1-2b-mine
-row; infra Part VI. 
 5. See Corporate Profile, supra note 1. 
 6. See Crystallex Informed of TSX Delisting, CRYSTALLEX (Dec. 07, 2011), 
http://www.crystallex.com/News/PressReleases/PressReleaseDetails/2011/Crystallex-Informed-
of-TSX-Delisting1127584/default.html. 
 7. Corporate Profile, supra note 1.   
 8. Id. See Reuters, Crystallex files for bankruptcy, FIN. POST (Dec. 23, 2011), 
http://business.financialpost.com/commodities/mining/crystallex-files-for-bankruptcy. 
 9. Crystallex files for bankruptcy, supra note 8. 
 10. Crystallex Int’l Corp, ICSID Award, ¶ 61. 
 11. See Litigation Funding Paves Way for Crystallex’s $1.4B Award Against Venezuela, 
BENTHAM IMF BLOG (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-
imf-blog/2016/04/06/third-party-funding-paves-way-for-crystallex-s-$1.4b-award-against-
venezuela. 
 12. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 122 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
 13. Tom Hals, Crystallex pursues Citgo as Venezuela misses settlement payment, Rᴇᴜᴛᴇʀꜱ 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-crystallex/crystallex-pursues-citgo-as-
venezuela-misses-settlement-payment-idUSL1N1OL2BG. 
 14. See Jonathan Wheatley, Crystallex reaches settlement in legal fight with Venezuelan 
government, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1526fb0d-ece1-30e8-93eb-
889be393cd0d. 
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2018, Crystallex was still awaiting Venezuela’s first substantial 
payment.15 Meanwhile, Crystallex continued to litigate against Venezuela 
in multiple United States district and circuit courts, as it attempted to 
execute on Venezuela’s assets.16 Notably, Crystallex is now attempting 
to execute on the assets of the Venezuela state-owned oil company’s 
subsidiaries.17 Venezuela’s many claimants and creditors are watching 
this litigation closely because it will determine the fate of billions of 
dollars of Venezuela-related assets held in the United States. 
Simultaneously, Venezuela and the governments of ICSID-contracting 
member states are watching Crystallex’s precedent-setting effort to 
execute on Venezuelan assets in the United States. The precedent set by 
Crystallex and Venezuela in this matter may affect how the execution of 
investor-state arbitration awards will be conducted in the future. Now 
(March 2019), Crystallex is getting closer to the assets of this 
incompatible state. Yet, this fight is far from over. 
“Incompatible state” is the term that I am using to describe states, 
like Venezuela, who cooperate with the ICSID proceedings but are 
unwilling or unable to pay out on awards, i.e., “defiant” but “compliant” 
states. These states use a mixture of political and legal maneuvers to 
simultaneously comply with their obligations under Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (“BITs”) and the ICSID Convention and, yet, avoid honoring 
judgments decided against them. A state’s transition from conforming 
contracting state to incompatible state can happen as quickly as when 
there is a downturn in the economy or a change in the regime. An 
incompatible state will have high volumes of pending or outstanding 
ICSID decisions against it, which renders ICSID’s enforcement and 
execution mechanism ineffective. When that happens, it leaves a state 
participating in the ICSID process without the intent or ability to honor 
the outcome. It follows that incompatible states pose an obstacle to the 
efficacy of ICSID-backed foreign direct investment because without a 
mechanism that allows investors to effectively execute on the assets of an 
 
 15. Hals, supra note 13. 
 16. See, e.g., Melissa Daniels, Crystallex Urges DC Circ. To Uphold $1.2B Venezuela Award, 
LAW 360 (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/967262/crystallex-urges-dc-circ-to-
uphold-1-2b-venezuela-award; Shayna Posses, Venezuela Again Urges DC Circ. To Nix OK of 
$1.2B Award, LAW 360 (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/979512/venezuela-
again-urges-dc-circ-to-nix-ok-of-1-2b-award; Christopher Crosby, Venezuela Says Mining Co. 
Can’t Claim $1.4B In BNY Funds, LAW 360 (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.law360
.com/articles/975393/venezuela-says-mining-co-can-t-claim-1-4b-in-bny-funds; Natalie Olivo, 
Venezuelan Oil Co. Decries Bid For Stock In $1.2B Award Row, LAW 360 (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/955224/venezuelan-oil-co-decries-bid-for-stock-in-1-2b-award-
row. 
 17. Hals, supra note 13; see infra Part V. 
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incompatible state, ICSID does not back up the investor. Therefore, while 
ICSID provides the investor with an award, the investor is left on its own 
to battle a sovereign in the United States legal system where sovereign 
immunity and corporate law favor the sovereign over the investor, which 
lowers the utility of the ICSID award. 
This article is divided into five substantive parts. Part II will provide 
background on the applicable law, establishment and development of 
ICSID, and the use of bilateral treaties before it makes a comparison 
between Argentina and Venezuela. Part III will provide an overview of 
the expropriation and the resulting dispute in Crystallex v. Venezuela. 
Part IV will provide information on the Award and the law governing the 
registration, enforcement, and execution of an award in the United States. 
Part V will explore the gap between what the ICSID dispute mechanism 
should do and how it deals with incompatible states, such as Argentina 
and Venezuela. Part VI will provide an update on the progress of the 
dispute as of March 2019. Part VII concludes the note. 
II.  ICSID FACES AN UNANTICIPATED SET OF CHALLENGES TO ITS 
EFFICACY OVER A HALF-CENTURY AFTER ITS FOUNDING  
Part II will emphasize the vital role ICSID plays in backing foreign 
direct investment and argue that Venezuela is dangerous to ICSID’s 
efficacy. This Part will begin with the history of international investment. 
It will provide background on the establishment and development of 
ICSID and will include an overview of bilateral investment treaties. With 
this foundation, we will see how ICSID’s solution worked until 
Argentina’s actions following the Argentine financial crisis challenged 
ICSID’s efficacy. Finally, this Part will compare Argentina’s situation 
with the current situation in Venezuela and argue that Venezuela poses a 
larger challenge to the ICSID system’s efficacy than Argentina did in the 
2000s. 
A.  The Washington Convention Corrected a Misalignment of Incentives 
Between States and Investors 
Part II (A) provides an overview of the state of foreign direct 
investment before the existence of international investor-state arbitration. 
We will first identify the parties, the host state, the investor, and the 
investor’s state. We will then look at each party’s incentives because their 
incentives did not align before the establishment of the ICSID 
Convention. After that, we will look at what each party gained, retained, 
and conceded when it joined the ICSID system of alternative dispute 
resolution. This section will show how foreign direct investment worked 
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before the ICSID Convention and how it should work under the ICSID 
Convention. 
i.  The Actors Involved in Foreign Investment Had Misaligned 
Incentives Pre-ICSID 
It is important to understand the actors and their incentives to 
appreciate the problem that the drafters of the ICSID Convention wanted 
to resolve. The first actor was the host state that sought private capital. In 
the 1960s, many developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa 
sought to invest more capital than their populations saved.18 And, while 
these countries often “possessed a wealth of natural resources, such as 
mineral deposits, many countries lacked the capital, technology or know-
how to exploit these resources.”19 The answer was foreign investment.20 
Foreign investment involves “capital flows from one country to another, 
granting extensive ownership stakes in domestic companies and assets” 
and the investor will have “an active role in management of its 
investment.”21 Yet, in a post-colonial world, the people of these countries 
valued their state’s sovereignty and feared the lack of independence and 
foreign exploitation that could result from foreign capital investment.22 
These fears were reflected in the terms offered by developing host states 
to foreign investors in the period leading up to the ICSID Convention in 
1965. The opportunities included terms lacking local legislative 
protection and requiring disputes to be settled in the host state’s court.23 
These terms provided the host state with leverage over the investor. 
The second actor was the foreign investor. The foreign investors had 
an entirely different set of incentives than the host state. Investors from 
places such as the United States and Canada looked for investment 
 
 18. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, 
AND INTERPRETATION 11-14 (2010). 
 19. See IMF, Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-Rich Developing Countries, 
Policy Papers (Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016
/12/31/Macroeconomic-Policy-Frameworks-for-Resource-Rich-Developing-Countries-PP4698 
[hereinafter IMF, Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource Rich Developing Countries]. 
 20. See INT’L BAR ASS’N, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAW: 
ISSUES OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW IN A 
NEW ERA 5 (Robert Pritchard ed. 1996) [hereinafter ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN 
INVESTMENTS AND THE LAW]. 
 21. See Foreign Investment, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/foreign-
investment.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
 22. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, 
AND INTERPRETATION 11 (2010). 
 23. See id. 
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opportunities abroad to increase diversification and total return.24 
Individuals and companies investing abroad likely tolerated higher levels 
of risk than domestic investors because they believed that certain foreign 
markets carry an acceptable level of risk that was compensated by the risk 
premium.25 The risks associated with foreign direct investment included 
being subject to a foreign government’s legal system when resolving 
investment disputes.26 By the 1960s, communism had spread across 
Europe and to parts of Asia, which made regime change another risk 
associated with foreign direct investment.27 Traditionally, investors 
feared the seizure or expropriation of their foreign investments,28 and 
socialist regime change likely compounded that fear.29 The increased risk 
to a potential investment meant that investors demanded more legal 
safeguards from a host state.30 Investors desired protection for their 
investments. 
The third actor was the investor’s state. The investor’s state often 
engaged in diplomatic relations with the host state.31 When an investment 
dispute arose between a host state and an investor that could not be 
resolved amicably in the host state, the investor’s only recourse was to 
urge its own state to act in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).32 
Arguably, the investor’s state had little interest in bringing an action that 
would jeopardize its relationship with the other government for the sake 
of an investor, which made the likelihood of action at the ICJ negligible. 
Thus, the system was ineffective because the investors and the investor’s 
state had conflicting interests in the treatment of the host state. 
 
 24. See Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, Globalization and Capital Markets, in 
GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 121 (Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor & Jeffrey 
G. Williamson eds., 2003); Joseph Nguyen, The 3 Biggest Risks Faced by International Investors, 
INVESTOPEDIA (May 7, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/11/biggest-risks-
international-investing.asp; VANDEVELDE, supra note 22, at 11. 
 25. Nguyen, supra note 24. 
 26. See SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND 
PRINCIPLE 30 (2d ed. 2012); DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 358 (3rd ed. 2015). 
 27. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 22, at 42-43. 
 28. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 358. 
 29. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 22, at 42-43. 
 30. See SUBEDI, supra note 26, at 28. 
 31. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 358-62. 
 32. The International Court of Justice provided a forum for state-to-state disputes, which 
included disputes where a host state wronged another state’s subject. Charity L. Goodman, 
Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 449 (2007). 
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In sum, the three parties involved in foreign direct investment in the 
1960s had misaligned incentives resulting from conflicting desires. The 
host state wanted foreign investment on the condition that it could retain 
jurisdiction over investment disputes and not cater to foreign investors in 
its domestic law. The investor wanted access to investment opportunities 
available only in developing countries but with some legal safeguards for 
the investment, such as a fair forum for dispute resolution. Finally, the 
investor’s state served as a reluctant advocate for wronged investors at 
the ICJ. The fact that the investor’s state operates to serve the interests of 
the nation rather than the interests of an individual investor makes the ICJ 
an unsuitable forum for investment dispute resolution. The parties needed 
an alternative forum that would align the incentives of the parties while 
requiring concessions from all of them. 
ii.  The World Bank Created the ICSID as a Solution to Align the 
Parties’ Incentives to Benefit All Involved in Foreign Investment 
The ICSID Convention cured the misalignment of incentives 
between states and investors by creating a neutral forum for dispute 
resolution. The next few paragraphs will highlight what each party 
gained, retained, or lost by participating in the ICSID system. 
The World Bank solved the problem by creating a “neutral forum” 
where investors could bring investment disputes against a host country.33 
The World Bank sponsored a multilateral treaty known as the ICSID 
Convention or Washington Convention.34 The sponsors believed that, 
“the provision of a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes 
would promote the flow of foreign investment into developing countries 
and thereby promote economic development.”35 The ICSID Treaty 
established the rules and a mechanism to achieve these ends, with the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) 
functioning as the mechanism.36 ICSID should be seen as the World 
Bank’s solution to the issues of international investment described above. 
This solution required give-and-take from each party and produced an 
alternative forum for investor-state arbitration. 
The investor gained access to a neutral forum that did not rely on 
the existing domestic legal system. This forum elevated investors to 
 
 33. See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 231 (2nd ed. 2012). 
 34. Id. 
 35. M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 164 (2000). 
 36. See MOSES, supra note 33, at 231. 
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actors at the international level.37 Before, international law did not 
recognize individual investors before ICSID gave them a platform.38 
ICSID likely lowered the investor’s risk of expropriation or unfair 
treatment without recourse because investors could compel arbitration at 
ICSID. An investor awarded compensation for unfair treatment or 
expropriation could enforce its award in any contracting state.39 Thus, this 
neutral forum generated investor confidence by lowering an investor’s 
risk of expropriation without compensation and by minimizing unfair 
treatment towards the investor by the host state.40 The investors retained 
the risk of expropriation with compensation and faced the difficulty of 
bringing a sovereign to task, which are risks explored later.41 
Furthermore, investors lost any immunity that came from not being an 
international actor. As an international actor, the investor could be 
brought to arbitration by the host country for breaching its obligations to 
the host country.42 
The host state gained access to foreign direct investment. Foreign 
investment brings capital, technology, and other know-how to developing 
countries.43 As an ICSID member state privy to this inflow of foreign 
investment, the host state gained a competitive advantage on its 
neighbors.44 To the early adopters of the ICSID Convention, ICSID gave 
a developing country a leg up over competition without requiring the 
country to drastically alter its legal or political system to cater to foreign 
 
 37. SORNARAJAH, supra note 35, at 165. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States art. 54, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention] (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966) 
 40. SUBEDI, supra note 26, at 30. 
 41. See infra Parts V-VI. 
 42. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 36. 
 43. See Kimberly Amadeo, Foreign Direct Investment, Its Pros, Cons and Importance to You, 
BALANCE (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/foreign-direct-investment-fdi-pros-cons-
and-importance-3306283.  
 44. You should consider the marketplace for foreign direct investment to understand why a 
developing country would become a contracting party to the ICSID Convention. As mentioned 
above, many developing countries required foreign capital to overcome a deficiency in national 
savings. Economics 101 tells us the following: when these countries entered the global market, they 
became competing suppliers of investment opportunities. Between two similarly-situated suppliers, 
the country that allowed an investor to bypass its legal system opting for a neutral forum for 
investment disputes provided the more attractive business opportunity. To the early adopters of the 
ICSID Convention, ICSID gave a developing country a leg up over competitors without requiring 
the country to drastically alter its legal or political system to cater to foreign investors. Thus, ICSID 
gave some developing states a competitive advantage, which eventually would turn into something 
that was necessary for a state to do to compete in the marketplace.  
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investors.45 The host state retained its ability to expropriate for a public 
purpose in exchange for compensation.46 
By opting into the alternative forum for investors, the host state 
retained its sovereignty in a few senses. First, the host state retained 
control of its domestic legal system. Second, the host state’s legislators 
did not need to cater to foreign investors in its domestic law. Third, the 
host state retained its sovereign immunity when courts of contracting 
states executed ICSID awards against the host state’s foreign held 
assets.47 The host state conceded its control over foreign investors’ 
disputes,48 and—without that control—its ability to expropriate foreign 
investments with impunity. However, if developing countries offered a 
potential investor an alternative to their own legal systems, investors 
would be “encouraged to invest in such states.”49 The improved 
“investment climate” in the state benefited both the host country and 
investor.50 
The investor’s state also would become a contracting party to the 
ICSID Convention. It can be argued that the state gained neutrality 
because it no longer needed to pick a side in a dispute between an investor 
and another state. The state would retain its freedom to focus on its own 
foreign policy interests rather than acting as the investor’s champion at 
the ICJ. Yet, as a contracting party to ICSID, the investor’s state 
conceded some of its control over who could bring an ICSID award to its 
courts. The investor’s state lost control because the ICSID convention 
requires contracting parties to “recognize” and “enforce” ICSID awards 
against investors or states as if they were final judgments in the domestic 
legal system.51 
iii.  The Result is the Modern ICSID System 
The ICSID Convention established an “independent, depoliticized 
and effective dispute-settlement institution.”52 The organization provides 
parties with the means of settling disputes through arbitration or fact-
 
 45. See generally VANDEVELDE, supra note 22. 
 46. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the Government 
of Canada for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Venez., art. V, July 1, 1996, 2221 
U.N.T.S. 1 [hereinafter Can.-Venez. BIT] (entered into force Jan. 28, 1998).   
 47. See infra Part V.  
 48. See infra Part II. B. 
 49. SUBEDI, supra note 26, at 30.  
 50. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 102 (2d ed. 2015).  
 51. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, art. 54. 
 52. About ICSID, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2018). 
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finding based out of the World Bank in Washington D.C.53 Every dispute 
is brought before an independent “Arbitration Tribunal” that will allow 
each side to present evidence and put forward legal arguments to inform 
the Tribunal’s decision.54 A 2017 study by the law firm Allen & Overy 
found the average arbitration row (ICSID and other arbitration panels) 
lasts 4 years.55 And the average ICSID Tribunal costs exceed 920,000 
USD, when including “arbitrators’ fees,” “expenses” and “institutional 
charges.”56 On average, a party spends 6,019,000 USD on legal fees to 
bring or 4,855,000 USD to defend against an investor-state row.57 This 
sum included money spent on attorney’s fees, experts, and witnesses.58 
For a wronged investor or state, this system has traditionally been worth 
the cost because it provides a forum to resolve disputes in front of a 
neutral body and the finality of a binding judgment enforceable in any 
ICSID contracting state.   
B. States Use Bilateral Treaties and ICSID to Encourage Foreign 
Direct Investment Between Equally Eager Investors and Developing 
Nations 
Part II (B) will explain that investment treaties compliment the 
ICSID solution. After the World Bank established the ICSID forum, 
individual contracting states needed to establish investment treaties 
among themselves that would generate the substantive law and select 
ICSID as the forum for future investor-state disputes. The first section 
will highlight the rise in the use of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) 
in tandem with ICSID. The next section will highlight the Canada-
Venezuela BIT that provides the substantive law and a forum selection 
clause for the Crystallex row. With the guarantees that Venezuela 
afforded Canadian investors in mind, the reader will be equipped to 
appraise Crystallex’s claims of “expropriation without compensation” 
and a breach of the promise of “fair and equitable treatment” (“FET”).   
 
 53. See About ICSID, supra note 52; Contacts—Headquarters, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/contacts (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).  
 54. See About ICSID, supra note 52. 
 55. Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Investment Treaty Arbitration: cost, duration 
and size of claims all show steady increase, ALLEN & OVERY: PUBLICATIONS (Dec. 14, 2017), 
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Investment-Treaty-Arbitration-cost-
duration-and-size-of-claims-all-show-steady-increase.aspx. 
 56. Hodgson & Campbell, supra note 55. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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i.  The Rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties Made ICSID Popular 
BITs elevated ICSID to relevancy in the 1990s.59 BITs gave ICSID 
jurisdiction over hundreds of investor-state contractual relationships.60 
The ICSID project began to gain momentum as the proliferation of bi-
lateral and multi-lateral investment treaties between developed and 
developing countries encouraged investment in the latter countries.61 As 
of 2017, there were over 2,300 BITs in force.62 Of all the cases registered 
at ICSID, BITs provided ICSID jurisdiction in 59.8% of the disputes.63 
One hundred sixty-two nations have signed on as contracting parties to 
the ICSID convention.64 In fact, the number of disputes registered with 
ICSID varied from none to four per year in the 1970s through the early 
1980s before increasing and taking off in the late-1980s and 1990s.65 
ICSID hosted an average of forty-two disputes per year in the 2010s.66 
These facts suggest that BITs worked to promote investors’ access to 
ICSID, and increased the popularity of ICSID investor-state arbitration. 
The substantive law that the ICSID Tribunal employs comes from a 
BIT. The substance of BITs deal “exclusively with foreign investment” 
and seek “to create an international legal framework to govern 
investments by the nationals of one country in the territory of another.”67 
A BIT will likely be a single document.68 Finally, each BIT follows a 
similar framework and shares key provisions.69 
ii.  The Can.-Venez. BIT Provides the Substantive Law and Forum for 
the Crystallex Row 
The Canada-Venezuela BIT of 1996 that features in the Crystallex 
v. Venezuela dispute resembles a prototypical BIT. The following articles 
 
 59. SORNARAJAH, supra note 35, at 167-68. 
 60. See id. at 168; International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD: INV.  POL’Y 
HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], The ICSID Caseload-Statistics, Issue 2017-1 
(2017), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-
1%20(English)%20Final.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) [hereinafter ICSID 2017-1 Caseload- 
Statistics].  
 61. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 35, at 167; ICSID 2017-1 Caseload Statistics, supra note 
60, at 18.  
 62. International Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 60. 
 63. ICSID 2017-1 Caseload Statistics, supra note 60, at 18.  
 64. Database of ICSID Member States, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages
/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2018). 
 65. ICSID 2017-1 Caseload Statistics, supra note 60, at 18.  
 66. Id.  
 67. See SALACUSE, supra note 50, at 100. 
 68. See id. at 141.  
 69. See id.  
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provide the relevant points of procedural and substantive law relevant to 
foreign investors in Venezuela. The articles also generate the causes of 
action available to those investors and submit the parties to jurisdiction 
at ICSID. By reading the following articles of the Canadian-Venezuelan 
dispute you will understand the blackletter law applicable to Crystallex’s 
dispute and appreciate the substance of a prototypical investment treaty. 
Article I of the treaty puts forward key definitions about 
investment.70 Article 1(f) defines investment as, “any kind of asset owned 
or controlled by an investor of one Contracting Party either directly or 
indirectly, including through an investor of a third state, in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the latter’s laws.”71 
Investment includes “(i) movable and immovable property and any 
related property rights . . . (vi) rights, conferred by law or under contract, 
to undertake any economic and commercial activity, including any rights 
to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.”72 The 
definition of investment is important for subject matter jurisdiction under 
ICSID. The organization is a center for investment disputes only.73 
Similarly, the parties stipulated as to who counts as an investor.74 Investor 
means “any natural person possessing the citizenship of Canada in 
accordance with its laws; or any enterprise incorporated or duly 
constituted in accordance with applicable laws of Canada, who makes the 
investment in the territory of Venezuela.”75 As a result, how the parties 
define investment dictates which types of enterprises will be protected by 
the BIT and granted an alternative dispute resolution forum. 
Article II and Article VII make certain guarantees about the 
establishment, acquisition, and protection of a foreign investment.76 The 
host country makes two guarantees about the investments of the other 
state, guaranteeing “fair and equitable treatment” and full “protection and 
security.”77 These causes of action are featured in the Crystallex dispute. 
Article V deals with expropriation.78 Investments of foreign 
investors “shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to 
measures having an effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation.”79 If the country does expropriate the investment, certain 
 
 70. Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. I.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. arts. II, V, VII. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. art. V. 
 79. Id. 
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procedural safeguards regulate expropriation.80 The expropriation must 
be for a “public purpose.”81 The decision to expropriate that investment 
must be made in a “nondiscriminatory manner” and by “due process of 
law.”82 Crucially, the investors must be granted “adequate and effective 
compensation.”83 The value of compensation shall be based on the 
genuine value of the investment immediately before the expropriation or 
at the time the proposed expropriation became public knowledge.84 The 
compensation and interest will be paid “without delay” after the 
expropriation.85 We will see that adequate compensation without delay 
forms the crux of the Crystallex dispute. 
Article XII addresses the settlement of disputes between an investor 
and the host state and provides the forum selection clause.86 First, the 
parties will attempt to settle the dispute amicably between themselves.87 
If that cannot happen, then the dispute may be submitted by the investor 
to arbitration.88 Article XII(4) provides that the dispute may be submitted 
to arbitration at ICSID if both states are contracting parties to the ICSID 
convention.89 Venezuela and Canada are both contracting parties to 
ICSID.90   
Article XII (9) sets out the award.91 The award can be monetary 
damages and interest or restitution of property, or both.92 The contracting 
party can opt for damages instead of specific performance.93 We will see 
that claimants prefer monetary damages over restitution, especially when 
the investment climate in the country changes. Article XII (10) proclaims 
the award of arbitration shall be final and binding, which mirrors the 
language in Article 54 of the ICSID Convention.94 
 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. arts. V, VII. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. art. XII. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, WORLD BANK 
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/List%20of%20Contra
cting%20States%20and%20Other%20Signatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20
Latest.pdf [hereinafter ICSID, List of Contracting States]. 
 91. Can.-Venez. BIT, supra note 46, art. XII. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. See infra Part IV.  
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C.  The 2001 Financial Crisis Created Unanticipated Challenges for 
ICSID Dispute Resolution When Argentina Undermined an Assumption 
of the ICSID Convention 
The following paragraphs detail a brief history of Argentina and 
provide a foil for a later discussion of modern Venezuela. Argentina 
existed as a member of the international investment community before its 
economy crashed in 2001.95 This section will highlight how Argentina 
responded to various ICSID claimants during its economic crisis and in 
the years following the crisis. Argentina’s simultaneous participation in 
ICSID disputes and criticism of the system left investors in an odd place. 
An investor that brought a claim at ICSID expected a tough fight because 
Argentina would use every procedural and substantive challenge to 
defend and delay against a finding for the investor. However, once the 
tribunal granted the investor an award, Argentina would cease to 
participate in the process. The result was a decline in investors’ 
confidence in Argentina, and arguably even a decline in investors’ 
confidence in ICSID itself. The problem of Argentina complying with 
ICSID disputes while choosing not to pay out on awards posed a novel 
issue for investors. 
i.  A Brief History of Argentina’s Economic and Global Affairs 
Argentina opened itself up to foreign investment in the 1990s and 
Argentina’s president began to privatize entire industries, including the 
public utilities sectors.96 For example, the government signed an 
Argentina-United States BIT.97 Argentina’s free trade policies resulted in 
an inflow of foreign capital into the Argentine economy.98 Yet, the 
globalization of Argentina’s domestic markets was cut short by a 
financial crisis. 
In 2001, Argentina’s economy collapsed.99 In the decade before the 
crash, the Argentine government had been borrowing heavily from 
foreign sources.100 Foreign debt totaled approximately 140,000,000,000 
 
 95. See Argentina- United States of America BIT (1991), UNCTAD: INV. POL’Y HUB, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mostRecent/treaty/162 (last visited Sept. 8, 2018). 
 96. A decline without parallel, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 28, 2002), https://www.economist
.com/node/1010911.  
 97. Argentina- United States of America BIT, supra note 95. 
 98. A decline without parallel, supra note 96. 
 99. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 1 (2007). 
 100. Argentina Total External Debt, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/
argentina/external-debt (last visited Sept. 8, 2018). 
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USD by the end of 2001.101 At the same time, Argentina had pegged its 
peso to the US Dollar.102 This practice, however, was unsustainable and 
Argentinians knew that the one to one ratio would not last forever.103 And 
so Argentinians rushed to their banks to exchange their pesos for 
dollars.104 The bank run led to protests.105 The protests led to political 
resignations.106 And, the political instability plunged Argentina further 
into economic and social crisis.107 Gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita dropped by nearly 20%, leaving 55% of Argentinians in poverty.108 
The change in the economy left Argentina insolvent and in crisis. 
ii.  Foreign Investors Row With Argentina at ICSID 
The Argentine crisis presented a challenge not only to Argentina’s 
creditors but also to foreign investors. Any foreign investor would have 
initiated arbitration proceedings, hoping to recover but knowing that 
Argentina had defaulted on over 140,000,000,000 USD of public debt.109 
Yet, wronged investors still sought enforcement through ICSID 
arbitration. 
Argentina denounced claims and mounted defenses in ICSID.110 In 
the aftermath of the crisis, Argentina rowed with wronged investors in 
ICSID tribunals. Argentina denounced the actions of the investors and 
ICSID while it participated in tribunals.111 Argentina, as the respondent, 
sought to complicate recovery throughout the arbitration process through 
a tactic of denying and delaying the process.112 This tactic made any 
investor’s dispute with Argentina expensive, long, and uncertain.113 
Argentina would comply with ICSID proceedings while utilizing 
procedural grounds to challenge awards.114 As Charity Goodman aptly 
 
 101. See Iris van de Wiel, The Argentine Crisis 2001/2002, RABOBANK (2013), 
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/august/the-argentine-crisis-20012002-/.  
 102. HARTEN, supra note 99, at 1.  
 103. Wiel, supra note 101.  
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Chronology: Argentina’s turbulent history of economic crises, REUTERS (July 30, 2014, 
10:55AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-debt-chronology/chronology-argentinas-
turbulent-history-of-economic-crises-idUSKBN0FZ23N20140730. 
 107. Chronology: Argentina’s turbulent history of economic crises, supra note 106. 
 108. Miguel Kiguel, Argentina’s 2001 Economic and Financial Crisis: Lessons for Europe, in 
THINK TANK 20: BEYOND MACROECONOMIC COORDINATION DISCUSSIONS IN THE G-20 7 (2011), 
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 111. See id. at 479.  
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pointed out in a 2007 comment, Argentinian officials publicly 
condemned the notion of paying foreign investors during a time of 
economic crisis.115 Yet, Goodman stated, “Argentina has indicated it will 
honor the Convention and use the narrow procedural grounds available 
to it to challenge these awards.”116 In effect, it postponed payment on the 
awards.117 Furthermore, while Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID 
Convention call for contracting states to recognize and enforce ICSID 
awards as final, Argentina officials claimed a right to review awards in 
its own court system “if they disturb public order.”118 This action would 
deprive the investor of the neutrality and the finality guaranteed by 
ICSID. These delay tactics proved costly to investor claimants trying to 
collect from Argentina. 
Investor confidence in Argentina and ICSID is lower than before the 
crisis. On Argentina’s post-crisis posture, Goodman stated that 
“Argentina is left balancing immediate issues of societal welfare with 
longer issues of shoring up foreign investor confidence in Argentina. It is 
not remotely settled which interest will win out.”119 Ten years on, we 
know that Argentina prioritized societal welfare. The Argentine economy 
has been growing at an average rate of 8% per year since the crisis.120 
However, these crucial gains came at the cost of Argentina’s international 
reputation because Argentina failed to fulfil its obligations to its creditors 
and ICSID claimants. Today, “Argentina has remained cut off from 
foreign capital markets and is considered a pariah by most investors.”121 
Yet, Argentina did not disaffirm the ICSID treaty.122 The fact that 
Argentina has been cut off from international capital markets has very 
likely stunted the country’s rising GDP.   
iii.  Argentina Thwarted Claimants and Defied ICSID 
In summary, 1990s Argentina encouraged the privatization of many 
industries and sought to encourage foreign direct investment in the 
Argentine economy. Argentina became a party to ICSID and numerous 
investment treaties that selected ICSID as its forum. In the early 2000s, 
Argentina’s economy collapsed, and the country became insolvent soon 
 
 115. See id. at 479. 
 116. Id. at 480. 
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 118. ICSID Convention, supra note 39, arts. 53-54; Goodman, supra note 32, at 469. 
 119. Goodman, supra note 32, at 481. 
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after. Foreign investors subject to the BITs filed claims through ICSID, 
which Argentina denounced as against the public interest and resisted at 
ICSID. Argentina then delayed payment on awards rendered against it by 
ICSID tribunals. This legal tactic eroded investor confidence in Argentina 
even though Argentina remained a party to ICSID and participated in 
disputes up until the award. Because investors lost confidence in 
Argentina, a contracting party to ICSID, it reflected poorly on the ICSID 
system, a system itself created to protect an investor’s expectation of a 
neutral forum where they could dispute with states and be compensated 
by those states when they deserve it.   
iv.  How Argentina Undermined Key Assumptions of the ICSID 
Convention and What Argentina Can Tell Us About Venezuela Today 
Argentina is important here for two reasons. First, the Argentine 
Crisis created unanticipated challenges for ICSID dispute resolution 
because Argentina undermined a fundamental premise upon which the 
ICSID Convention functioned. Argentina’s response to the ICSID claims 
after the Argentine Crisis undermined the notion that a contracting state 
would honor awards rendered against it. Argentina’s inability and 
unwillingness to honor awards rendered against it undermined the 
assumption that ICSID provided investments adequate protection from 
actions of the host state. Furthermore, Argentina demonstrated an 
effective defense strategy within the parameters of the ICSID rules, 
which thwarted claimants’ expectations by delaying any payment on 
some awards and settling other awards. 
Second, Argentina provides an interesting comparison to Venezuela 
today. As of this writing, Venezuela’s claimants and creditors face many 
of the same challenges that Argentina’s creditors faced in the 2000s. 
Venezuela is teetering in bankruptcy and has many foreign creditors and 
claimants at ICSID.123 And, by the looks of it, Venezuela is using 
Argentina’s ICSID playbook by actively delaying and challenging 
claimants at ICSID. Yet, in many ways, Venezuela presents a bigger 
challenge to its claimants and to ICSID than Argentina did before it. 
Therefore, Venezuela is not another Argentina. Instead, Venezuela is a 
tougher adversary to wronged investors, and it is currently incompatible 
with the ICSID system.   
 
 123. Javier Ferrero, Venezuela versus the ICSID Convention, GLOBAL ARB. NEWS (Feb. 24, 
2015), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/venezuela-versus-icsid-convention-20120422/; How 
Long Can Venezuela Avoid Default, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.economist.com
/news/americas/21730895-south-americas-insolvent-left-wing-champion-has-been-star-
sovereign-bond-markets-how-long. 
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D.  Venezuela: The Rise of an Incompatible State 
This portion is about Venezuela and its rise as a state incompatible 
with ICSID. The first three paragraphs show how Venezuela flipped from 
embracing ICSID and foreign investment to rejecting them. This section 
will provide a history of Venezuela’s political, economic, and foreign 
policy in three snapshots: the 1990s, the 2000s, and the 2010s. 
Venezuela’s transformation illustrates why Venezuela, like Argentina, 
will likely ruin investor’s expectations at ICSID.124 Like Argentina in the 
2000s, Venezuela is nearly insolvent and has adopted Argentina’s 
litigation strategy of delaying or challenging awards, which makes 
arbitration costly, lengthy, and uncertain for potential creditors.125 
Furthermore, Venezuela poses a greater chance of thwarting investor’s 
expectations at ICSID than Argentina because its government does not 
care about the international investment system and because it benefits 
from participating in ICSID disputes to protect the foreign assets of its 
state-owned oil enterprises’ foreign assets.126 For these reasons, the 
ICSID system will likely fail to deliver the compensation investors expect 
from Venezuela because the government is making itself incompatible 
with ICSID. 
i.  Venezuela in the 1990s: Globalization Under Andrés Pérez 
First, it is important to look at the Venezuela that joined ICSID and 
the globalization movement in the 1990s. In the 1990s, Venezuela 
operated under a democratic style of government.127 Carlos Andrés Peréz 
of the left-leaning Democratic Action Party held the Presidency.128 While 
a democracy, Venezuelans experienced a chaotic political and economic 
situation in the 1990s.129 President Peréz dealt with an economic 
downturn and fought off two coup attempts by Colonel Hugo Chávez 
during his presidency.130 Yet, President Peréz’s government eagerly 
participated at the international level and showed a willingness to 
embrace globalization.131 The government borrowed money from the 
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International Monetary Fund during its economic downturn in the early 
1990s.132 The Venezuelan government joined the ICSID Convention in 
1993.133 And, in 1996, the government would sign the Canada-Venezuela 
Bilateral Investment Treaty.134 These three actions reflected the 
Venezuelan government’s willingness to embrace international 
institutions and globalization. And so, the Venezuela that joined the 
international investment community embraced globalization, perhaps to 
remedy its domestic economic and political instability. This instability 
did not make Venezuela unsuitable for international investment. The 
ICSID system was created to provide stability for foreign investors within 
a host state.135 Investors willing to enter the Venezuelan economy could 
bypass the local legal system and arbitrate with Venezuela at ICSID.136 
And, as an active participant in the international community, investors 
likely believed that Venezuela would cooperate at ICSID proceedings 
because 1990s Venezuela embraced foreign direct investment and ICSID 
as a solution to its economic instability. 
ii.  Venezuela in The 2000s: Socialism Under Chávez 
Next, it is important to look at Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. The 
Venezuelan people elected Hugo Chávez in 1998.137 President Chávez led 
the “Bolivarian Revolution,” a “socialist political program,” under the 
banner of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (the “PVSU”).138 The 
PVSU altered Venezuela’s democratic system of government by 
changing the constitution and by passing an enabling law in 2000.139 With 
this power, President Chávez worked to end corruption and to increase 
spending on social programs.140 He financed the latter by tapping into the 
state-run oil company to fund his spending on healthcare, subsidized 
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food, and education.141 The high prices of oil in the mid-2000s meant that 
the oil-producing country could divert its oil profits into these expensive 
social programs without issue.142 After his re-election in 2006, President 
Chávez began to nationalize entire industries, and, by the time of his 
death in 2013, the government had nationalized much of its agriculture, 
oil, and gold industries.143 Venezuela’s status as a party to ICSID and a 
party to many bilateral investment treaties failed to deter Chávez’s regime 
from expropriating foreign investments.144 Yet, the ill-effects of Chávez’s 
meddling in the operation of the state-owned oil company and the 
nationalization of many private businesses were not immediate. Instead, 
Venezuelans enjoyed an increase in the standard of living during 
Chávez’s tenure from 1998–2013.145 At the international level, Chávez’s 
government publicly contemplated pulling out of ICSID because of the 
mounting number of claims resulting from Chávez’s expropriations of 
whole industries.146 Under Chávez, Venezuela transformed from a willing 
participant in economic globalization to a government that nationalized 
many of its big industries.147 This Venezuela represented the sort of 
sovereign against which the ICSID system was designed to combat by 
protecting investments against expropriation and biased adjudication.148 
But Venezuela would transform once again under President Maduro in 
present times. 
iii.  Venezuela in Present Times: Authoritarianism Under Maduro 
Venezuela under President Maduro is not a democracy. President 
Chávez chose Maduro as his successor in 2013.149 Since then, Maduro’s 
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party, the PVSU, has controlled all branches of government.150 President 
Maduro and the party continue to follow Chávez’s nationalistic and social 
policies.151 These policies have stifled the free market.152 Without 
capitalism, Venezuela continues to rely on its oil exports as its chief 
source of income;153 oil exports have consistently counted for almost all 
of Venezuela’s exports and nearly half of the government’s revenue.154 
This reliance became an issue when oil prices dropped over 40% in 
2014.155 Additionally, the state owned oil company, Petróleos de 
Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), has become less efficient at producing oil 
since the government under Chávez took control of its operations.156 
Taken together, the drastic drop in revenue from oil exports has left the 
Venezuelan economy in shambles;157 since 2014, the Venezuelan 
economy has been in recession.158 
Compared to 2000s Argentina, Venezuela is much worse off. The 
Economist recently cited three university studies estimating that 82% of 
Venezuelan households live in poverty compared to 48% in 1998 before 
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Chávez.159 “Venezuela’s GDP in 2017 is 35% below 2013 levels.”160 
Essentially, present day Venezuela is poorer and less accountable than 
the Venezuela of the 1990s or 2000s. 
iv.  Venezuela is Incompatible With ICSID 
Venezuela is in a unique position from an international standpoint. 
The government has denounced the international investment system and 
ICSID.161 It has repatriated much of its foreign reserves.162 Now, the 
government stands to default on its sovereign debt,163 and its potential 
liabilities to ICSID claimants number in the billions of dollars.164 One 
would think that the government would recede from the international 
system. Yet, Venezuela is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”).165 As a result, Venezuela’s state-owned 
oil company, PDVSA, cannot operate without having assets abroad.166 So, 
while the Venezuelan government denounced the ICSID convention in 
2012,167 it continues to participate at ICSID, perhaps for fear of claimants 
executing on its oil company’s foreign assets.168 This reality forces the 
Venezuelan government to actively participate in the ICSID system; a 
system that the country’s government openly denounces.169 The result is 
a government that has an incentive to participate in ICSID disputes to 
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protect its foreign held assets. Yet, it has little incentive to honor awards 
for fear of its international reputation or pay out of respect for its 
obligations as a former party to the ICSID convention—a system it has 
denounced.170 For this reason, Venezuela is incompatible with the ICSID 
system. 
v.  Venezuela is More Dangerous to Investors Than Argentina 
It is helpful to compare Argentina in the 2000s to Venezuela today 
to understand why the ICSID system of dispute resolution and award will 
not work with Venezuela. Like Argentina following its 2000 economic 
crisis, Venezuela is facing insolvency.171 Insolvency means that any 
ICSID claimant trying to recover will be up against two obstacles. First, 
a claimant will be up against a country with few attachable assets at home 
or abroad. Second, a claimant will be competing with the country’s other 
creditors, whether they are sovereign debt holders or otherwise. This 
crowded field reduces the chances for, and the amount of, any potential 
recovery against Venezuela. In addition, Venezuela, like Argentina 
before it, has been an active participant in the ICSID dispute process. 
It is evident that Venezuela is using Argentina’s ICSID method: 
deny and delay.172 Venezuela has denied wrongdoing at every step of the 
arbitration and enforcement process and delayed enforcement by using 
every procedural and substantive challenge available.173 The results have 
been good for both countries.174 It is good in the sense that the countries 
succeeded in postponing payment on ICSID awards for years, denying 
expropriated investors financial relief and discouraging future claimants 
from trying themselves.175 For example, Argentina had not paid CMS 
Energy, its first claimant to receive an ICSID award following the 2001 
Argentine crisis, as of 2009.176 That was eight years after the crisis, four 
years after the award, and two years after a review of that award.177 This 
example shows that Argentina’s efforts to resist payment from within the 
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ICSID system worked successfully. Argentina did not settle with CMS 
Energy until 2013.178 As we will later explore through the Crystallex case, 
Venezuela might be taking a similar path in the present day. In sum, the 
ICSID system will likely fail to deliver what investors expect they are 
owed from Venezuela. 
There are some notable differences between Venezuela and 
Argentina that would further affect Venezuela’s status as an ICSID 
participant. In addition to the similarities with Argentina’s economic 
situation and litigation strategy, Venezuela has followed through and 
denounced the ICSID system.179 Argentina disapproved of the alternative 
dispute process during its financial hardships, but it remained a 
contracting party to ICSID.180 This inaction indicates that Argentina cared 
about its international reputation. Venezuela’s government does not seem 
to care about its international standing among “Western” states or about 
alienating foreign investors to the same degree as Argentina.181 This point 
is evidenced by Venezuela’s denouncement of ICSID.182 Traditionally, a 
contracting member’s regard for its international standing acts as a soft 
check ensuring a host state pays out on awards.183 Without regard for its 
international standing, the Venezuelan government is less likely to pay 
out.184 Next, the chance of Venezuela complying is lower because its 
government has denounced the ICSID Convention because its leaders 
disagreed with the principles behind it.185 Venezuela is also less likely to 
pay out because it probably does not fear being shunned by the 
international community for failing to honor the ICSID awards because 
the country is already heavily sanctioned by large players, such as the 
United States.186 In this respect, Venezuela is less compatible with the 
ICSID system than Argentina. This incompatibility poses a challenge for 
Venezuela’s claimants and for the ICSID system in general. 
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Another difference between Venezuela and Argentina is that 
Venezuela is more resource-abundant than Argentina.187 This fact is 
significant for two reasons. First, resource-abundant developing countries 
operate around their wealth of natural resources. Venezuela happens to 
sit on the world’s largest proven oil reserves.188 In addition to oil, the 
country has a wealth of minerals, such as gold deposits.189 Resource-rich 
developing countries often need foreign companies with the capital and 
knowhow to exploit these reserves—these host countries are particularly 
attractive for foreign direct investment in the energy and mining 
sectors.190 As a result, these developing countries host more foreign 
investors, and those investors rely on ICSID to protect their substantial, 
immobile investments.191 For investors in natural resources within 
Venezuela, Chávez’s expropriation of entire sectors left foreign investors 
dependent on ICSID for protection and compensation.192 Because of the 
nature of these investments, the amount in controversy was much larger 
than it was in Argentina.193 Venezuela expropriated investments worth 
billions rather than millions of dollars.194 Furthermore, the number of 
these high value claimants far exceeded the number of high value 
claimants against Argentina.195 This fact matters because this amount 
constitutes the dollar figure that ICSID will be strained to protect on 
behalf of these investors, dollars that must be collected from Venezuela, 
a country that is less willing to be collected from than Argentina. 
Second, Venezuela being resource rich has important implications 
for Venezuela’s exposure to execution attempts on assets abroad. A state-
owned oil company, such as PDVSA, likely needs assets in other 
countries to continue its operations overseas. These assets then become 
targets for the sovereign’s creditors and claimants abroad. 
Notwithstanding legal fictions between a sovereign and a state-owned 
enterprise, the exposure of these foreign-held assets incentivizes 
Venezuela to vigorously defend against execution attempts in a way that 
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Argentina did not because it lacked state-owned enterprises operating 
abroad. There are two conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion. 
First, Venezuela has an incentive to thwart the execution of awards on its 
assets to a high cost. Second, Venezuela’s creditors, unlike Argentina’s 
creditors, may have another source of treasure from which to take their 
award, the state petrol company’s assets. This feat will require litigation 
and favorable new case law that whittles away at the legal fiction that 
separates the sovereign from its state-owned enterprises’ subsidiaries.196 
This note will touch on these ideas more in Part V. 
vi.  Venezuela Poses a Threat to the ICSID System and International 
Investment in Developing Countries 
Venezuela’s participation in the ICISD system may have adverse 
consequences if Venezuela succeeds at not compensating investors from 
whom the Venezuela government has expropriated investments. There 
exist other contracting parties to ICSID much like Venezuela.197 These 
parties are developing countries that are rich in natural resources or host 
quickly expanding markets. The countries’ current leaders may advocate 
for globalization and encourage foreign investment. However, as seen 
with Venezuela, a downturn in the economy or a regime change can lead 
to an entirely different climate in the host state. In Venezuela, socialism 
led to nationalization and the expropriation of massive amounts of foreign 
direct investment.198 If Venezuela manages to use the ICSID system to 
thwart compensation of the expropriated investors in Venezuela, that will 
set a precedent for contracting parties to ICSID worldwide. So far, the 
ICSID system has provided wronged investors with an alternative forum 
and a way to collect on a host state’s foreign assets. The rest of this article 
will explore whether the owners of investments expropriated by 
Venezuela’s government will be able to rely on this system to be 
compensated or if Venezuela’s keen participation in the process and 
attempts to delay will undermine investors’ expectations of protection 
and compensation.   
To summarize, Venezuela plays by the rules while it stalls—at every 
chance it gets—by putting up procedural or litigation-related roadblocks. 
Meanwhile, Venezuela’s government has been repatriating its assets, 
distancing itself from its oil company’s assets, and bracing to default on 
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its foreign debt. Venezuela’s stance and status make it incompatible with 
the ICSID system. This incompatibility could lead to trouble for many 
investors relying on ICSID to recover from Venezuela post-Chávez. 
Crystallex’s struggles illustrate this point. 
III. THE ICSID DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS IS EQUIPPED TO HANDLE 
MATTERS BETWEEN INVESTORS AND UNCOOPERATIVE STATES UP TO THE 
AWARD STAGE AS SHOWN BY CRYSTALLEX V. VENEZUELA 
Part III will state the facts of the dispute that arose between 
Crystallex and the Venezuelan government over the right to exploit Las 
Cristinas and its vast gold deposits. This Part also highlights the ICSID 
dispute, the claims, and the Tribunal’s award. Part III concludes by 
analyzing the upsides and downsides of ICSID arbitration for the parties 
in this dispute. 
A. This Dispute Arises from Venezuela’s Expropriation of Las Cristinas 
Mine from Crystallex 
The Crystallex v. Venezuela fight originates from disputed rights to 
land in a forested region of the State of Bolívar in the Guayana region of 
southeast Venezuela.199 The “Las Cristinas” area sits within the Imataca 
National Forest Reserve.200 This land sits on some of the largest proven 
gold deposits in the world.201 However, when Crystallex acquired the 
rights to exploit any mineral reserves under Las Cristinas, few knew 
about the rich gold deposits, that is, other than illegal miners.202 These 
miners’ unsavory ventures encouraged the government to reclaim the 
mineral rights to Las Cristinas from the previous owner in 2002.203 
The redistribution of the mining rights brings our parties into the 
mix.204 Venezuela’s Ministry of Energy and Mines (“Ministry of Mines”) 
administered the government’s natural resources at the national level.205 
The Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (the “CVG”) operated at the 
state level as a state-run corporation for Guayana.206 The government 
chartered CVG to grow the economy of the region.207 In this case, the 
Ministry of Mines entered into an administrative agreement with CVG 
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concerning the Las Cristinas deposits in April of 2002.208 This agreement 
left CVG in charge of partnering with a company to exploit the land.209 
In turn, CVG executed a Mine Operation Contract (“MOC”) with 
Crystallex that September.210 The MOC highlighted the rights and 
obligations of both parties.211 In short, Crystallex was to develop the mine 
at its own expense, invest in the local community, and provide $15 
million in consideration.212 In exchange, Crystallex would receive “the 
proceeds deriving from the sale of its gold production.”213 This process 
would require Crystallex to satisfy many regulatory requirements.214 The 
MOC obligated CVG to help see Crystallex through the process by 
obtaining the requisite permits and by acting as the intermediary between 
the Canadian miners and Venezuela’s mining and environmental 
agencies.215 The parties satisfied their obligations without issue from 
2002–2007, allowing Crystallex to request Autorización Para Afectar 
Recursos Naturales (the “Permit”).216 
Crystallex could not begin operations until the Ministry of 
Environment issued a permit authorizing mining.217 However, this 
permitting application came last. The Permit would have followed the 
Ministry’s approval of the Environmental Impact Statement.218 Yet, the 
Ministry did not issue the Permit in 2007, and from June 2007, the parties 
waited on the Ministry’s decision.219 Shortly thereafter, the global 
recession started.220 In April 2008, the Ministry denied Crystallex’s 
Permit application.221 After that, the Ministry denied Crystallex’s motion 
for reconsideration on the Permit.222 What should have been a routine 
approval had turned into the Ministry’s denial for environmental reasons 
and a concern for the indigenous people.223 
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President Chávez and other leaders made public statements about 
Las Cristinas while Crystallex fought to secure the Permit.224 Some of the 
exhibits presented by Crystallex to ICSID highlight the public statements 
made about Las Cristinas in 2008.225 For example, in September 2008, El 
Universal quoted President Chávez telling the public, “In Guayana, we 
are taking back big mines, and one of them is one of the biggest in the 
world . . . it’s gold!”226 In November, the Minister of Mines said that the 
“State would take back, operate, and manage the Las Cristinas mine,” 
formerly owned by Crystallex within a year (2009).227 At this time, 
Crystallex’s MOC agreement was in effect, and the Ministry of 
Environment continued corresponding with Crystallex about its efforts to 
obtain the Permit.228 In 2010, Chávez announced that Las Cristinas had 
been handed over to transnational companies but that “the revolutionary 
government recuperated it” because “these mineral resources [were] for 
the Venezuelan people, [and] not for transnationals.”229 
CVG rescinded its MOC with Crystallex in February 2011.230 The 
CVG rescinded through a clause that granted permission to rescind the 
contract when all activity ceased for a year.231 Crystallex could not act 
without the Permit.232 Crystallex could file a Request for Arbitration 
against Venezuela with the ICSID per Article XII of the BIT.233 And so, 
Crystallex filed its request that same week.234 
B.  The Tribunal Ruled on the Merits and Awarded Crystallex 
1,202,000,000 USD 
February 2011 marked the start of a five-year dispute between 
Crystallex and Venezuela at ICSID.235 The proceeding began with 
Venezuela’s jurisdictional challenges to ICSID having jurisdiction over 
the dispute. Recall that Part II of this article covered the Canada-
Venezuela BIT in which the parties opted for ICSID as the forum of 
choice.236 This option allowed the Tribunal to resolve all jurisdictional 
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issues quickly.237 Crystallex made three claims based on Venezuela’s 
failure to comply with its guarantees under the Canada-Venezuela BIT.238 
The Tribunal found for Crystallex on two counts in its April 2016 Award 
(the “Award”).239 The Award stated that Venezuela owed Crystallex 
1,202,000,000 USD plus interest.240 
Crystallex succeeded on the merits for two out of its three claims 
against Venezuela.241 The claims came from law established in the 
Canada-Venezuela BIT discussed earlier on.242 First, Crystallex claimed 
that Venezuela denied it “Fair and Equitable Treatment” (“FET”) under 
Article II(2).243 Second, Crystallex claimed that Venezuela denied the 
investment “Full Protection and Security” under Article II(2).244 Finally, 
Crystallex claimed that Venezuela expropriated its investment under 
Article VII(1).245 The Tribunal found that Venezuela had violated its 
promise to treat Crystallex “fairly and equitably” and found that 
Venezuela had expropriated its investment.246 
The Tribunal’s analysis of the FET claim hinged on the Ministry of 
Environment’s denial of the Permit.247 The Tribunal began by explaining 
that the FET clause protected Crystallex’s legitimate expectations against 
arbitrariness, a lack of transparency, and inconsistent government 
actions.248 Crystallex had a legitimate expectation that the Permit would 
be reviewed fairly after the company met the requirements and posted its 
bond.249 And Venezuela “engaged in arbitrary conduct in denying the 
Permit and rescinding the MOC.”250 The vague reasons for denial 
indicated a lack of transparency.251 Thus, Venezuela’s actions in denying 
the Permit violated the FET clause of the BIT treaty.252    
Next, the Tribunal decided that Venezuela had expropriated 
Crystallex’s investment without just compensation.253 Article VII(1) of 
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the treaty provides “that any expropriation must be carried out (i) for 
public purposes, (ii) under due process of law, (iii) in a non-
discriminatory manner and (iv) against prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.”254 The denial of the Permit and rescission of the MOC 
constituted an expropriation of Crystallex’s investment.255 The Tribunal 
respected (i) the public purpose of the expropriation to “reclaim” the mine 
for the people and (ii) found no due process concerns.256 The Tribunal’s 
expropriation analysis leant the earlier FET analysis (iii) to find 
discrimination.257 However, the dispositive issue came from the failure of 
Venezuela to provide Crystallex any compensation.258 The Tribunal 
found (iv) that no “adequate and effective compensation” had been 
provided to Crystallex.259 And so, the Tribunal set about calculating “the 
genuine value of the investment” at the time of expropriation.260 
The Tribunal awarded Crystallex 1,202,000,000 USD in damages in 
April of 2016.261 The Tribunal determined Crystallex’s reparations by 
calculating the fair market value of the investment at the time of 
expropriation.262 The Tribunal used the average of the Stock Market 
Approach and the Market Multiples Approach to come up with 
1,202,000,000 USD.263 That figure represents the fair market value of the 
investment at the time when Venezuela denied the Permit, making the 
valuation date April 13, 2008.264 Up to the award stage, the BIT and 
Tribunal functioned to provide Crystallex the protection it expected from 
the system. 
C.  The Dispute Highlights the Advantage of Pursuing Five Years of 
ICSID Arbitration but also the Substantial Costs Connected to ICSID 
Arbitration   
To sum up this section, Crystallex worked from 2002 to 2007 to 
prepare mining Las Cristinas.265 Crystallex surveyed the gold reserves, 
complied with regulatory filings, and invested in the local community at 
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a cost of over 500,000,000 USD.266 Venezuela denied Crystallex a Permit 
in 2008.267 With a hostile political climate in Venezuela, Crystallex 
brought its expropriation claim at ICSID by way of the Canadian-
Venezuelan BIT.268 The ICSID Tribunal granted Crystallex 
1,202,000,000 USD in damages for Venezuela’s expropriation of its 
investment in 2016.269 Crystallex left five years of arbitration armed with 
a billion dollar award but incurred over 30,000,000 USD in legal fees and 
1,000,000 USD in arbitration fees.270 Possessing the Award, Crystallex 
found a litigation financier willing to fund the collection stage of the 
process, in exchange for 35% of any return.271 Concurrently, Venezuela 
paid over 14,000,000 USD in legal fees and 974,000 USD in arbitration 
fees.272 In hindsight, Venezuela’s greater-than-14,000,000 USD payment 
was money well spent as Venezuela bought itself another four years to 
avoid paying out for expropriating Las Cristinas. After all, an ICSID 
award is just a piece of paper, . . . and Crystallex still had to collect. 
IV.  CRYSTALLEX REGISTERED ITS AWARD IN THE U.S. COURT WITHOUT 
ISSUE; EXECUTING ON VENEZUELA’S ASSETS IS THE PROBLEM 
Crystallex chose to register its Award in the United States.273 Section 
Six of the ICSID Convention provides for the recognition and 
enforcement of an award.274 Within Section Six, Article 53 provides that 
the “award shall be binding on all parties and shall not be subject to 
appeal.”275 Article 54 provides that a contracting state must also recognize 
that an award is binding on the parties.276 It also provides that a state must 
enforce any monetary damages imposed by that award as if the damages 
came from a final judgment from a domestic court.277 Here, Article 53 
binds Venezuela and Crystallex to the results of the Award.278 And 
Venezuela cannot appeal the substance of the decision in its own court or 
in the court of another contracting state.279 Crystallex had the ability to 
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register the Award in any contracting state.280 Crystallex chose to register 
its award in the United States, a contracting party to ICSID.281 Crystallex 
likely chose to register in the United States because of the amount of 
business the Venezuelan state oil companies’ subsidiaries do in the 
United States.282 Judge Rudolph Contreras of the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia recognized the Award in March of 
2017.283 The Court’s recognition of the Award satisfied the United States’ 
obligations as a contracting party to ICSID under Article 54.284 The 
recognition also allowed Crystallex access to other UNITED STATES 
jurisdictions in its quest to seek enforcement.285 For Crystallex, 
registration placed it closer to collecting from Venezuela. For Venezuela, 
Venezuelan counsel could not do much to stop the recognition 
mechanism because it is well defined by the ICSID Convention.286 And 
so, while Venezuela could not appeal the Award or its recognition in the 
United States, Venezuela could bring other actions to frustrate 
Crystallex’s efforts to collect. 
The United States’ recognition of the Award does not guarantee a 
payout. There exists a distinction between the “recognition or 
enforcement” of an award and the “execution” of an award.287 Article 
54(c) says that, “execution of the award shall be governed by the laws 
concerning the execution of judgments in force in the state in whose 
territories such execution is sought.”288 “ICSID itself has no formal role 
in the recognition and enforcement of an award under the ICSID 
Convention.”289 Article 55 clarifies that ICSID does not override 
domestic law related to the execution of money damages against a 
sovereign’s assets.290 And so, for Crystallex to execute its Award on 
specific Venezuelan assets held in the United States, Crystallex’s 
attorneys must navigate United States’ sovereign immunity law. 
Under United States Federal Law, “the property in the United States 
of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and 
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execution.”291 Sovereign immunity applies to both foreign states and the 
agencies or instrumentalities of the foreign state.292 An agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state includes any entity that is “a separate 
legal person,” and that is “an organ of a foreign state” or “a majority of 
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state,” 
and that is neither a citizen of the UNITED STATES nor is created under 
the laws of a third country.293 Here, the foreign state subject to sovereign 
immunity would be Venezuela. Additionally, Venezuela’s state-owned 
oil company, PDVSA, is considered to be a state instrumentality and is 
afforded sovereign immunity. So we know that generally Venezuelan 
assets are shielded by sovereign immunity in the United States. Section 
1610, however, provides specific exceptions that may apply in Crystallex 
and Venezuela’s situation. 
Congress provided exceptions to a sovereign’s immunity from 
attachment or execution in 28 U.S.C. § 1610.294 The exception that applies 
here is found in § 1610(a)(6) and is as follows: 
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state used for a 
commercial activity in the United States shall not be immune from 
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment 
entered by a court of the United States . . . if, (6) the judgment is based 
on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the foreign 
state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would 
not be inconsistent with any provision of the arbitral agreement.295 
This exception contains several notable elements. The property 
must be used for a “commercial activity in the United States.”296 “A 
‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of commercial 
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.”297 If a sovereign 
has property in the United States and uses that property in the United 
States for a commercial activity, then the exception to sovereign 
immunity applies and the property is executable.298 In a similar spirit, the 
property of a state instrumentality that engages in commercial activity 
may also lose sovereign immunity and that renders it executable.299 This 
commercial-activity-related property can be distinguished from a 
 
 291. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1609 (LEXIS through P.L. No. 115-230). 
 292. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(a) (LEXIS through P.L. No. 115-230). 
 293. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(b). 
 294. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610 (LEXIS through P.L. No. 115-230).  
 295. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(a)(6). 
 296. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(a). 
 297. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1603(d). 
 298. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(a). 
 299. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610(b). 
WESSON (FINAL_FOR_JCI) 10/28/2019  2:15 PM 
2019] Venezuela Undermines Crystallex 181 
sovereign’s property used for a public activity, i.e., when the assets would 
be used to conduct the government’s over-sea operations.300 Next, § 
1610(a)(6) says that a judgment from an arbitral award can be executed 
on a sovereign’s assets used for a commercial activity.301 In the Crystallex 
matter, any property that Venezuela has in the United States that is used 
for a commercial activity in the United States is executable. However, 
that is not true of the property of Venezuela’s state instrumentality, 
PDVSA, because that entity does not operate in the United States. 
Instead, the PDVSA operates in the United States through its corporate 
subsidiaries incorporated in Delaware.302 
Delaware corporate law requires PDVSA’s Delaware subsidiaries 
to be treated as independent from PDVSA and Venezuela.303 PDVSA is 
the parent company of PDV Holding Inc., a Delaware Corporation.304 
PDV Holding Inc. is the parent company of CITGO Holding, Inc.305 
CITGO Holding, Inc. currently owns 100% of the capital stock of Citgo 
Petroleum Corporation and 100% of the LLC interests of several other 
petroleum companies operating in the United States.306 The Oklahoma-
based Citgo Petroleum Corporation generated “$42.3 billion and earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) in 2013 
. . . .”307 The point being that Venezuela, through its state-owned oil 
company subsidiaries, has a wealth of assets in the United States. 
Crystallex cannot easily execute on the property of PDVSA’s subsidiaries 
under the current law.308 The law forces Crystallex to either enforce on 
Venezuelan assets subject to § 1610(a)(6) or push the boundaries of the 
law by attempting to execute on assets related to the PDVSA’s 
subsidiaries. Crystallex did both. 
In sum, sovereign immunity presented a challenge for Crystallex in 
its effort to execute its Award on Venezuelan assets in the United States 
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as the United States sovereign immunity law provided a potent strategy 
of avoidance for Venezuela. This dynamic presents a challenge for an 
ICSID claimant dealing with an incompatible state—a challenge that is 
explored in Part V. 
V. THE ICSID SYSTEM FOR ENFORCEMENT STRUGGLES TO INCENTIVIZE 
INCOMPATIBLE STATES TO HONOR JUDGEMENTS 
The ICSID system struggles to incentivize or force incompatible 
states to pay up on Awards rendered against them. This Part will focus 
on the payment of ICSID awards by sovereign states. First, we will look 
at the ideal situation. Second, we will look at how states have traditionally 
complied. Third, we will look at what happened when Argentina could 
not pay and refused to honor judgments against it. Finally, we will 
examine how Venezuela created a situation which the ICSID framers did 
not anticipate: the execution of awards against a defiant but “compliant” 
state. 
A.  Ideally, a State Honors the ICSID Judgment Against It 
Ideally, a state honors an ICSID award recognized against it in any 
contracting state’s legal system. Margaret Moses pointed out several 
reasons for this assumption in International Commercial Arbitration.309 
First, states voluntarily contracted to join ICSID in the hopes of 
benefiting from foreign investment.310 Second, states that want to 
continue to receive the benefits of foreign direct investment should 
comply to maintain their reputation internationally.311 Moses observed 
that states that want to continue to receive the benefit of World Bank 
loans would not shirk the World Bank’s arbitration center’s awards.312 
Moreover, “a state’s noncompliance with an ICSID award exposes that 
state to various sanctions set forth in the Convention.”313 
B.  Traditionally, States Did Honor ICSID Awards 
Traditionally, states have honored ICSID judgments rendered 
against them.314 Speaking in the mid-1980s, the late Georges Delaume, a 
senior legal advisor to ICSID, stated that “in practice . . . the problems 
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attendant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . are only theoretical” 
because “no ICSID award to date has been the object of enforcement 
proceedings.”315 Delaume, encouraged by states’ active participation in 
ICSID proceedings, believed that a state’s participation in arbitration 
would lead to its “increased willingness either to comply with the award 
or to reach a settlement with the investor.”316 So states voluntarily opted 
for ICSID, rowed in ICSID, and honored ICSID judgments to preserve 
their international reputations and to access to foreign capital.317 That 
generally proved to be the case until Argentina’s financial crisis of 
2001.318 
C.  Lately, Argentina Could Not Pay and Avoided Honoring Awards 
The expectation that all states would willingly pay out on an ICSID 
award crashed alongside the Argentine economy in 2001. Insolvent 
Argentina disapproved of the ICSID system and indicated that it would 
put the interests of its people before those of foreign investors.319 
Argentina pioneered several “diversionist tactics” and “succeeded in 
avoiding payment of every award rendered in favor of investors.”320 
Argentina’s leaders unapologetically put Argentina before the sanctity of 
the ICSID system.321 To Argentina, considerations such as preserving its 
international reputation, paying out for the sake of fairness, or even its 
long-term access to foreign capital markets, fell to the wayside of its 
domestic goal of supporting its people by restoring its economy.322 
Argentina had little choice but to challenge, evade, and eventually 
settle ICSID claims against it. The economy had crashed and many 
people lived in poverty.323 In 2007, Charity Goodman wrote about how 
economic crisis and states like Argentina posed a threat to ICSID.324 In 
2018, Venezuela poses an even more serious threat. The Venezuelan 
government nationalized many industries and expropriated foreign 
investments while a wealthy country under Chávez.325 In 2012, it 
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denounced the ICSID Convention to stop future claims.326 Since that time, 
the government’s policies have resulted in its economic collapse.327 As of 
Quarter 4 of 2017, Venezuela was practically insolvent; Venezuela was 
not insolvent at the time of the expropriation in 2007 nor at the time that 
Crystallex received its Award in 2016.328 Yet, while facing insolvency, 
Venezuela still actively disputes claims against it, using many of the legal 
tactics that Argentina implemented successfully to delay payment and 
force settlement.329 Venezuela’s political and economic status combined 
with its vigorous avoidance of paying ICSID awards makes Venezuela 
incompatible with ICSID.   
D.  Now, Venezuela Created a Situation that the ICSID Framers Did 
Not Anticipate: The Execution of Awards Against a “Defiant” but 
“Compliant” State 
Crystallex first settled with the Venezuelan government for an 
undisclosed amount on November 23, 2017.330 Under the agreement, 
Crystallex agreed to suspend its efforts to enforce the Award.331 The 
settlement came after Crystallex made several attempts to execute on 
Venezuelan assets located in the United States.332 This effort required 
multi-front litigation in several United States federal district courts, 
including in the District of Columbia, New York, and Delaware.333 
Venezuela used procedural and substantive tactics to defend and delay 
payment on the 1,202,000,000 USD award.334 While Venezuela resisted 
the ICSID award enforcement proceedings, its government scraped 
together enough money to make payments on its sovereign debt and the 
debt owed by its oil company, PDVSA.335 In November 2017, Venezuela 
became insolvent on its sovereign debt.336 The wealthy Venezuela that 
expropriated Crystallex’s investment ten years earlier no longer existed, 
which left Crystallex with little choice but to ditch the ICSID system and 
to settle. 
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After the author submitted this note in March 2017, Crystallex and 
Venezuela’s dispute continued in court and to make headlines.337 As of 
March 2018, Crystallex continues its efforts to execute on Venezuelan 
assets.338 In August 2018, a Delaware District Court allowed Crystallex 
seize shares in PDV Holding, Inc.339 As mentioned in Part IV, PDV 
Holding, Inc. is a subsidiary of PDVSA and the parent company of Citgo, 
and Citgo is a profitable company with United States-based assets.340 
Venezuela appealed this “landmark” decision to the Third Circuit.341 The 
decision triggered a flurry of action as Venezuela’s other creditors as well 
as its bondholders scramble to secure their interests in Venezuela’s 
“largest U.S. asset.”342 Another interested party in the Third Circuit case 
is Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó.343 Guaidó objects to 
Crystallex’s seizure of the state-owned oil company’s subsidiary’s assets 
on foreign policy grounds.344 So the defiant but compliant state continues 
on, and the end is not in sight. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The result of Crystallex v. Venezuela is unclear. Yet, one thing is 
clear. The ICSID system in its current form does not provide wronged 
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investors with all the tools they need to effectively execute ICSID awards 
against incompatible states. The current system allows each contracting 
party to keep its laws regarding the execution on a sovereign’s assets. For 
Venezuela, ICSID’s inadequate execution system coupled with United 
States sovereign immunity and corporate law proved effective tools to 
undermine Crystallex’s efforts to collect its reward. For Crystallex, the 
ICSID system assisted the company from its initial investment up until 
the Award. For the execution process, however, the ICSID system left 
Crystallex alone to dig deep in search of novel legal grounds within the 
United States legal system . . . and, with the Third Circuit decision, it may 
have struck gold. 
 
